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We provide benchmarks to evaluate what is an optimal foreign debt and a
maximal foreign debt (debt-max), when risk is explicitly considered. When
the actual debt exceeds debt-max, then the economy will default when a
"bad shock" occurs. This paper is an application of the stochastic optimal
controls models of Fleming and Stein (2001), which gives empirical content
to the question of how one should measure "vulnerability" to shocks, when
there is uncertainty concerning the productivity of capital.  We consider two
sets of high- risk countries during the period 1978-99: a subset of 21
countries that defaulted on the debt, and another set of 13 countries that did
not default. Default is a situation where the firms or government of a country
reschedule the interest/principal payments on the external debt. We thereby
explain how our analysis can anticipate default risk, and add another
dimension to the literature of early warning signals of default/credit risk.
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COUNTRY DEFAULT RISK: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
Jerome L. Stein and Giovanna Paladino
I. IS THE FOREIGN DEBT A RESULT OF A BUBBLE?
Data on the credit rating of bonds issued in the first half of the 1990s suggest that
investors in emerging market securities paid little attention to credit risk, or that they were
comfortable with the high level of credit risk that they were incurring
1. The compression
of the interest rate yield spread prior to
2 and the subsequent turmoil in emerging markets
have raised doubts about the ability of investors to appropriately assess and price risk.
Moody's indicated that there was a need for a "paradigm shift" that involves a greater
analytic emphasis on the risks associated with the reliance on short-term debt for
otherwise creditworthy borrowers.
There is a general agreement about the qualitative or broad aspects of the Asian
crises of 1997
3. In 1990 the International Monetary Fund commended Thailand's strategy
for growth. Trade and finance were liberalized, and there was a relatively restrictive fiscal
policy. The liberalization stimulated investment, and the excess of investment over
private saving was financed through capital inflows. There was little inflation. After the
crises of 1997, the common view was that the Asian economies were in a bubble and
were"vulnerable" to shocks.
The description of the bubble and "vulnerability" implied that the private external
debt was "excessive". The bubble was characterized by "overinvestment" in real capital,
because there were implicit government guarantees. The main guarantee was that there
was a pegged exchange rate, so that the exchange risk was ignored. This led to an
                                                
1 This section relies on International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets, Washington DC (1999),
and International Monetary Fund, Anticipating Balance of Payments Crises, Occasional Paper #186,
(1999).
2 The market expectations as embodied in interest rates did not widen significantly prior to the Mexican
crisis. In the Asian crises, spreads hardly increased in the months prior to the floatation of the Bhat. The
credit rating agencies and the market analysts all failed to signal the Asian crises in advance. They
downgraded these countries only after the crises.
3 See Alba et al. (1999) and Corbett and Vines (1999), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini(1999).Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 3
"unduly" large private external debt. There were also implicit "bailout" provisions that
encouraged bank lending.
A bubble is an unsustainable phenomenon, which is burst by shocks that have
positive probability. The latter results from (i) a decline in the productivity of capital, for
example as a result of declines in export prices, (ii) a loss of competitiveness due to an
overvalued real exchange rate, or (iii) rises in the world interest rate. It then becomes
more difficult to service the external debt. When the market perceives that there will be
problem servicing the debt, there will be a capital flight which drains reserves. Since
banks are highly levered, the resulting depreciation of the currency leads to bank failures
and rises in interest rates. A destabilizing feedback occurs where a decline in the
productivity of capital interacts with rises in interest rates to generate the currency and
banking crises.
A difficulty with the consensus description is that there is no benchmark for
measuring "vulnerability" or "excessive" external debt. Corbett and Vines, who present
this "consensus" view, nevertheless write that: vulnerability is an idea that is surprisingly
difficult to pin down. One needs a "benchmark" of what is an optimal foreign debt in a
world of uncertainty.
There is an extensive theoretical literature that purports to describe the evolution
of the foreign debt, investment and consumption as an intertermporal optimization
process by a "representative agent". The foreign debt just results from consumption
smoothing. These models fail to explain exchange rate developments, currency, banking
or debt crises
4. This literature ignores risk, by making assumptions that imply certainty
equivalence, and there is no constraint that the country repays the debt. Our paper
develops a paradigm for risk management or inter-temporal optimization under
uncertainty, in a finite horizon discrete time context
5 with the constraint that there be no
default on foreign currency denominated debt. The finite time horizon model concerns
                                                
4 For a critique of this literature see Stein and Paladino (1997). Similarly, the use of the Maximum Principle
in continuous time assumes perfect certainty. Neither approach is useful in a world of risk and uncertainty.
By contrast, Infante and Stein (1973) used dynamic programming to solve for inter-temporal optimization in
an environment where there is not perfect knowledge. The derived suboptimal feedback control drives the
economy to the unknown perfect certainty optimal path.
5 An infinite horizon continuous time context is provided in Fleming and Stein (1999)Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 4
short-term external debt. The constraint in a repeating cycle of two period models is that,
regardless of the state of nature in the second period, there will be no default on the debt.
We derive: (a) benchmarks for optimal foreign debt, which will not be defaulted
in the event of adverse shocks, and (b) a quantitative measure of the maximum debt that
satisfies the no-default constraint. Insofar as the actual debt exceeds the benchmark, the
risk of default is increased. An excessive debt occurs for several reasons. (a) The agents
use certainty equivalence, as is done in the theoretical literature. (b) There is the moral
hazard issue, which has been stressed in the literature on crises cited above. The
government provides implicit insurance, such as a pegged exchange rate, that induces
firms to ignore/underemphasize risk. When the shocks occur however, the government
cannot fulfill its promise. (c) The borrower is overly optimistic about the distribution
function of the return to investment. (d) Both borrowers and lenders neglect to constrain
the optimization that there be no default/rescheduling.
1.1 Organization
In part 2 we outline alternative theoretical approaches to evaluate quantitatively
whether the foreign debt is either sustainable or optimal. Part 2.1 summarizes the
conventional solvency/sustainability criteria. Parts 2.2 - 2.3 summarize the stochastic
optimal control model of Fleming and Stein (2001). They provide benchmarks to measure
"vulnerability" to shocks based on the notion of "optimal" investment, saving and short-
term foreign debt, when there is uncertainty concerning the productivity of capital.
In part 3, the research design, data and sample are discussed. We consider a set of
21 countries during the period 1978-99 which "defaulted" on the debt, and a "control"
group of 13 countries that did not default. Default is defined as a situation where private
firms or the government of a country reschedule the interest/principal payments on the
external debt owed to either commercial banks or to official institutions. On the basis of
the theoretical presentation in parts 2.2 - 2.3 and research design in part 3, we compare
the external liabilities of private or public debtors in countries that defaulted/did not
default on their bonds with our concepts of the optimal or maximal debt/GDP. In part 3.1,
we compare two countries in the two groups: Mexico and Tunisia. Parts 3.2 and 3.3Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 5
concern a comparison of the two groups based upon panel data, and state our main
conclusions.
II. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO EVALUATING EXTERNAL DEBT
2.1 The Solvency/Sustainability Criterion
6
The literature has used a “solvency-sustainability” approach to monitor foreign
debt. An economy is considered solvent if the ratio of external liabilities/GDP will remain
bounded, and the debt service payments/GDP will not explode. The sustainability of the
current account deficit relies on projecting into the future the current policy stance of the
government and/or of the private sector. Sustainability is ensured if the resulting path of
the foreign debt is consistent with “inter-temporal solvency”. We explain why the
solvency-sustainability approach is not capable of revealing vulnerability.
Denote by h(t) = L(t)/Y(t) the ratio of the foreign debt L(t)  denominated in foreign
currency $US to Y(t), the real GDP also measured in $US. The rate of change of the
foreign debt/GDP is equation (1). The interest rate at which the dollars are borrowed is
r(t), the growth rate of the real GDP is g(t), and m(t) is the trade deficit/GDP. The trade
defcit/GDP is equal to j(t) = investment/GDP less s(t) =saving/GDP. The growth rate g(t)
= (dY(t)/dt)/Y(t) is equal to the productivity of capital b(t) = dY(t)/dK(t)  times  j(t) =
(dK(t)/dt)/Y(t) the ratio of investment/GDP. The equation for the growth of the debt is (1),
where: a(t) = r(t) - g(t) = the interest rate less the growth rate ; m(t) = [j(t) - s(t)] = trade
defcit/GDP; g(t) = b(t)j(t) = growth rate of GDP.
dh(t)/dt = [r(t) – g(t)]h(t) + m(t) = a(t)h(t) + m(t), (1)
Solve for h(t) the debt/GDP at any time and derive equation (2), where term
A(t) = ∫  a(v)dv = ∫  [r(v)- b(v)j(v)]dv, t > v > 0. Think of A(t)/t as the average interest rate
less the growth rate over the interval (0,t); and A(v)/v as the average interest rate less the
growth rate over the interval (0,v<t).
                                                
6 See for example International Monetary Fund, WEO May 1998, Box 8, pp. 86-87.Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 6
h(t) = h(0)e
A(t) + ∫  e
(A(t) – A(v)) m(v)dv,  t > v > 0. (2)
The debt/GDP can be attributable statistically to the components of (2): sustained
trade deficits, m(t) > 0 equal to sustained excess of investment minus saving, interest
rates in excess of growth rate a(t) > 0, and low growth rates b(t)j(t) due to either low
productivity of capital or low investment ratios.
The solvency-sustainability literature looks at the "debt burden" as a measure of
"vulnerability". The "debt burden" DB(T) is defined in equation (2.1) as the trade surplus
[-m(T)] required to keep the ratio of the debt/GDP ratio constant at its current level at
time T, denoted  h(T). The solvency/sustainability argument assumes that current [r(T) -
g(T)] is given. Then the higher is DB(T), the more burdensome is the debt, and the greater
the likelihood of default.
DB(T) = [r(T) – g(T)]h(T) (2.1)
This approach does not allow one to evaluate whether a debt is excessive and
whether it will lead to vulnerability, for the following reasons. First: it is impossible to
know the future value of the debt h(t) for  t > T, because the future growth rates and
interest rates are unknown. This means that quantities A(t) and A(v) in equation (2) are
unknown. Second: the trade deficit m(t)  and the growth rate g(t) are not independent. A
trade deficit that finances investment j(t) will lead to a higher growth rate in the future,
since the growth rate is the product of the productivity of capital and the investment rate.
Third: a trade deficit in the present does not imply a high debt in the future. For example,
a high rate of return on investment relative to the world interest rate stimulates capital
formation. The latter raises investment less saving, generates a capital inflow, which
appreciates the real exchange rate. The latter leads to a trade deficit, which accomplishes
the transfer of resources, and the debt rises. The higher investment ratio times the
productivity of capital will eventually raise the growth rate. In other words, the higher
productivity of capital will eventually raise GDP and saving, and generate a trade balance
to repay the debt. The debt may go through a cycle: it first may rise and then decline
below its initial level. Consequently, it is misleading to look the debt burden DB(T) =
[r(T) - g(T)]h(T) based upon the current values, and infer whether or not there will be a
debt crisis. Nor is it useful to look at the current trade deficit [j(T) - s(T)] to inferStein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 7
vulnerability. It is no surprise that the researchers who have used the solvency-
sustainability approach have doubted its usefulness. The International Monetary Fund
WEO Report (May 1998, Box 1, p. 87) wrote: “…these simple solvency tests would
clearly have failed to signal problems ahead for the fast-growing Asian economies,
including Indonesia and Korea”.
2.2 Stochastic Optimal Control
Fleming and Stein [F-S:1999, F-S:2001] derived the optimal levels of the foreign
debt L(t), investment J(t) and consumption C(t) in a world of uncertainty, subject to the
constraint that there be no default/rescheduling. [F-S:1999] analyze optimization over an
infinite horizon in continuous time, using the techniques of stochastic optimal control-
dynamic programming. [F-S:2001], focus on a repeating two period model where the debt
is short-term. Risk is explicitly considered: there is no certainty equivalence, as is
assumed in the literature. The "no default" constraint in the optimization is crucial. The
derivations in both the models are extremely technical. We therefore just present an
intuitive discussion of the discrete time case, which leads into the empirical analysis.
2.3 Stochastic Optimal Control: Discrete Time over a Two Period Horizon
We consider a series of repeating two period cycles. In the first period, the GDP
denoted by Y(1) = b(1)K(1), where K(1) is the capital stock and b(1) is the current
productivity of capital. In period t =1, the country selects consumption and investment.
The trade deficit, equal to consumption plus investment less the GDP, is financed through
short-term foreign debt. The interest rate r is known. The productivity of capital b(2) in
period t =2 is the crucial stochastic variable. The GDP in the second period is Y(2) =
b(2)[K(1) + J(1)], where K(1) is the initial capital and J(1) is the rate of investment in the
first period. The variables are measured in $US.
The productivity of investment b(2) is stochastic for the following reason. Dollars
are borrowed at interest rate r to purchase capital and produce an output, which is sold in
the world market. The dollar value of the output depends upon several factors: the terms
of trade (export/import prices), the exchange rate of the country and the productivity ofStein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 8
the investment. If the terms of trade deteriorate, the investment is ill advised or the
exchange rate depreciates, the productivity of the investment b(2) measured in $US
declines. Then the repayment of the dollar denominated debt is more costly. Instead of
viewing the effect of exchange rate uncertainty upon the interest payments denominated
in foreign currency, we view the uncertainty via the productivity of investment.
The risk/uncertainty is contained in the net return on investment x = [b(2) - r], the
stochastic productivity of capital b(2) less r, the known interest rate. The range of b(2) is
r + a/2, a > 0. The values of the net return x = [b(2) - r] are symmetrical around zero with
a range a > 0, as described in Box 1, with probabilities (p, 1-p), 1 > p > 0, in the good and
bad case respectively. This is a simple and general formulation that makes minimal
assumptions about the distribution function.
   BOX 1. UNCERTAINTY CONCERNING THE NET RETURN x = [b(2) - r]
  b(2) Pr(b) Consumption  C(2)
b




  = r – a/2 (1-p) > 0 bad case C
-(2)
Productivity of capital in the second period is b(2) = Y(2)/K(2). The interest rate is r. The
net return is x = b(2) - r. The expected net return E(x) = E[b(2)-r] = a(p - 1/2); range
[b(2)-r] = a > 0. Risk concerns the realization of the "bad" case. Var (x) = a
2p(1-p)
The optimization concerns the sum of the utility of consumption in the first period
plus the expectation of utility of consumption in the second period. The consumption in
the second period is equation (3). It is equal to the stochastic GDP less the repayment of
debt and interest (1+r)L(2) less investment I(2).  Default/rescheduling of debt will occur
if consumption in period two falls below a certain minimum tolerable level, which we
shall call C(t)min = 0. The "no default" constraint is that C(2) in equation (3) be positive.
C(2) = b(2)[K(1) + J(1)] - (1+r)L(2) - I(2) > 0.  (3)
The debt carried into the second period L(2) is consumption plus investment less
GDP in the first period, the trade deficit, equation (4)
L(2) = C(1) + J(1) - b(1)K(1). (4)
In a series of repeating cycles, we use a terminal condition that the capital at the
beginning of period t = 3 is the same as the initial capital K(1). This implies condition (5).
J(1) + J(2) = 0.  (5)Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 9
Then the consumption in the second period is equation (6), using (3)(4) and (5). The no-
default constraint is that C(2) > 0.
C(2) = b(2)K(1) + [b(2) - r]J(1) + (1+r)[b(1)K(1) - C(1)] > 0 (6)
The net return on investment [b(2) - r] is a/2 in the good case with probability p, and
(-a/2) in the bad case with probability (1-p). The consumption in the good case is C
+(2),
and is C
-(2) in the bad case.
The utility is a HARA function U(C(t)) = (1/γ )C(t)
γ , where γ  < 1. Risk aversion is
(1-γ ) > 0. The most interesting and useful cases are when γ  < 0. The γ  = 0 case is the
logarithmic utility function. Then the utility of zero consumption is minus infinity; and
the optimization will avoid that situation. Controls C(1) and J(1) are selected in period
t=1 to maximize the sum of the expected utility of consumption over the two periods,
subject to the no-default constraint. This is equation (7), using (6).
max E[J] = max {(1/γ )C(1)
γ  + (1/γ )[pC
+(2)
γ  + (1-p)C
-(2)
γ ] } (7)
[F-S:2001] then derive the optimal consumption, saving and investment in the
first period, and resulting debt. An asterisk denotes constrained optimal values. The
constrained optimization (C-O) explicitly considers risk, since there is no assumption of
certainty equivalence.
2.3.1 The Maximal Debt: No default constraint
The maximal debt is defined as the debt associated with zero consumption, if the bad case
materializes. Hence if the actual debt exceeds the maximal debt, this is a sufficient
condition that there will be default/renegotiation. The no default constraint is described as
follows. Divide equation (6) by initial output Y(1) = b(1)K(1), where c(1) = C(1)/Y(1),
c(2) = C(2)/Y(1), j(1) = J(1)/Y(1) and f(2) = L(2)/Y(1). We obtain equation (8).
c(2) =  b(2)/b(1) + [b(2) - r]j(1) + (1+r)[1 - c(1)] > 0 (8)
Consumption c(2) will be zero in the bad case where b
-(2) = r - a/2 if equation (9),
graphed in figure 1, is satisfied. The higher the investment rate j(1), which has a negative
net return (b
-(2) - r)= -a/2 < 0, the lower must be initial consumption c(1) to ensure that
c(2) = C(2)/Y(1) > 0.Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 10
c(1) = {[(b
-(2)/b(1)] /(1+r)  + 1} + [(b
-(2) - r)/(1+r)] j(1) => c(2) = 0 (9)
Equation (9) is the hypotenuse of right triangle 0AB in figure 1. Call the interior of 0AB
the no default constraint. For values of {c(1), j(1)} outside the triangle, c(2) will be
negative.
Figure 1. Consumption c(1) and investment j(1), per unit of Y(1). No default constraint
c(2) > 0 is that [c(1), j(1)] lie inside triangle 0AB.Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 11Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 12
The debt L(2)/Y(1) = f(2) = c(1) + j(1) - 1. Substitute c(1) = f(2) + 1 - j(1) in
equation (9) to obtain the maximal debt, denoted (f-max). Equation (10) is a
transformation of equation (9) in terms of debt f(2) and investment j(1). If the actual debt
exceeds the maximal then the economy is above triangle 0AB, and with probability (1-p)
> 0 there will be a default.
 f-max = [b
-(2)/b(1) + (1 + b
-(2)) j(1)] / (1 + r).   (10)
2.3.2 Optimization
The C-O debt, investment and saving are described in figure 2 based upon
equations (10)-(12). All are measured as fractions of current GDP, which is Y(1) =
b(1)K(1). The expected net return denoted by E(x) = E[b(2) - r] = a(p - 1/2), is plotted on
the abscissa. Here, we only present the results where the utility of consumption is
logarithmic
7.Optimal saving/GDP in period one s*(1) is independent of the expected net
return
8, equation (11).
S(1)/Y(1) =  s*(1),  independent of E(x) .  (11)
In the standard literature, which makes the certainty equivalence (CE)
assumptions, the optimal stock of capital is adjusted until the expected marginal
productivity is equal to the interest rate. If the expected productivity of capital is
independent of the stock of capital, there will be a "bang-bang" solution. If E(x) = E[b(2)
- r] > 0, a maximal/infinite amount will be borrowed at rate r to finance the maximal
investment. A maximal amount of risk is assumed. If E(x) < 0, then investment is zero,
and the country is a creditor equal to saving s*(1). The CE debt is CE-0-CE' in figure 2,
where 0C' practically coincides with the ordinate.
In our model where risk is explicitly taken into account and there is a no-
default/rescheduling constraint, we obtain a very different result. Even though there are
no diminishing returns to capital, the investment ratio j(1) in equation (12) does not have
a bang-bang solution. Optimal investment j*(1) is zero, for values of the expected net
                                                
7 The general case is shown in tables 2 and 3 in Fleming-Stein (2001).Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 13
return E(x) = E[b(2) - r] less than d, where d = (a/2)
2 /A > 0. The numerator is the square
of downside risk (a/2)
2, and coefficient A = [(1+b(1))(1+r) - 1] > 0. For values of E(x) >
d, the investment rises in proportion to coefficient A > 0. Unlike the certainty equivalent
case in the literature, the (C-O) rate of investment is zero, even if the expected
productivity of capital exceeds the interest rate, but by less than d>0.
When E(x) > d = (a/2)
2/[(1+b(1))(1+r) - 1] > 0:
I(1)/Y(1) = j*(1) = A(E(x) - d),  (12a)
              When E(x) < d:.
 j*(1) = 0 (12b)    
The C-O debt/GDP carried into period two, f*(2) = L(2)/Y(1) = j*(1) - s*(1)  is the
doubly bent line CE-A-e-B-C in figure 2, equal to the vertical difference between
investment, equation (12) less the constant saving ratio s*(1). Equation (13) and figure 2
describe the C-O foreign debt f*(2) carried into period two, per unit of GDP in period
one, where s*(1) and j*(1) are given by the equations above. Section BC of the curve in
figure 2 embodies the no default constraint (f-max).
(13) f-max > f*(2) = j*(1) - s*(1).
Figure 2. Constrained optimal (CO) debt f*(2) as fraction of GDPin a repeating 2-period
model. x = b(2) - r. When E(x) < d, the country is a creditor/GDP equal to s*. The
debt/Y(1) is zero at E(x) = e and rises linearly to a maximum of f-max.  The certainty
equivalent (CE) debt is CE. The creditor position is saving s* for E(x) < 0; and for E(x) >
0, the debt/GDP is infinite.
                                                                                                                                                
8 This is the logarithmic case.Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 14Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 15
In figure 2, the country should be a net creditor if the expected net return on
investment E(x) = a(p - 1/2) is less than e It should be a debtor when E(x) exceeds
e. The maximum debt/GDP is f-max. With the derived C-O debt and investment, the
present value of expected utility is maximal, subject to the constraint that there will be no
default if the "bad event" occurs: x = (-a/2) < 0. As the actual debt exceeds the C-O debt
f*(2), the present value of expected utility declines, and the probability of default
increases.
One benchmark for evaluating the actual debt/GDP is that it should be the constrained
optimal debt f*(2) = j*(1) - s*(1), curve CE-A-e-B-C in figure 2. A weaker benchmark for
the debt is that there should be no default: f(2) < f-max.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN: SAMPLE, DATA AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESIS
The [F-S:2001] stochastic optimal control model relates the constrained optimal
total external public plus private debt of a country to fundamental variables. In our
empirical work, we consider a set of 21 countries that concluded rescheduling agreements
on their external private
9 plus public debt with commercial banks and with official
creditors during the period January 1980 - December 1999. Appendix 1 and table A2,
derived from the World Bank "Global Development Finance", list the entire set of
countries that rescheduled and the dates of agreement.  These countries are contrasted
with thirteen emerging market countries that did not default, table A3.
The basic variables are
10: the actual external public debt/GDP ratio h(t), the
productivity of capital b(t), the interest rate r(t) on foreign currency denominated debt, the
growth rate g(t) of real GDP, and the ratio j(t) of investment/GDP. An estimate of the
gross productivity of capital b(t) is the inverse ICOR
11, where b(t) = dY(t)/dK(t) =
[dY(t)/dt /Y(t)] / [J(t)/Y(t)] = g(t)/j(t), equal to the growth rate of GDP divided by the ratio
                                                
9 In some cases, private borrowing was supported by implicit government guarantees.
10 Our data are from: World Bank (Global Development Finance), the IMF(International Financial Statistics
) and IIF( countries data sets).
11 ICOR is the incremental capital output ratio.Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 16
of gross investment/GDP. The net return x(t) = b(t) - r(t). The productivity of investment
b(t) is gross of depreciation and obsolescence.
 The debt/GDP ratio combines short and long term external debt, but the
theoretical analysis is based upon a two period model where the debt plus interest must be
repaid. A similar relation between the optimal debt/GDP and the net return is found in
both the infinite horizon model and in the two period model. The difference is that in the
two period model, the debt plus interest must be repaid by the end of period two; and in
the infinite horizon model, the only requirement is that the debt must always be serviced.
Operationally, the only significant difference is in the concept of the maximal debt f-max.
Given the mix of maturities, we use the inclusive measure of the external debt.
The application of the Fleming-Stein theoretical analysis is carried out in two
parts. First: we compare Mexico, a country that defaulted/rescheduled his debt, with
Tunisia which did not default. Second: we examine the panel data of the countries that
defaulted relative to those that did not.
3.1. Comparison between Mexico and Tunisia
Mexico experienced currency crises in September 1976, February and December
1982 and December 1994, and concluded ten debt- rescheduling agreements with
commercial banks, and three with official creditors, during the two decades January 1980
- December 1999 (see appendix 1). These agreements were concentrated in the periods
1983-90 and 1996. Tunisia is not listed among the countries that rescheduled. A
comparison of the two countries provides us a better understanding of the subsequent
panel data analysis. Table 1 summarizes the basic relations used in our analysis.
Table 1. COMPARISON OF MEXICO AND TUNISIA
The median debt/GDP, row 1, was higher in Tunisia (0.61), which did not default
than in Mexico (0.45), which rescheduled many times in our sample period 1980-99. It is
not the debt ratio h(t) that determines the probability of default, but rather an excess of the
actual ratio h(t) compared to the debt-max.Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 17
Equation (10), repeated here, is the relation between the debt and j(1) which will
lead to a zero consumption in the bad case, when b(2) = b
-(2). This corresponds to the
situation in figure 1. When c(1) is on or above the triangle 0AB, then default will occur in
the bad case. The f-max corresponds to the hypotenuse line AB, as described in section
2.3.1 above. The value of f-max in (10) is conditional upon the rate of investment j(1).
We see in table 1, row 5, that there was a small variance to the rate of investment/GDP in
the countries. We use the median rate of investment as j(1). The interest rate is in row 4.
Box 1 above presents our theoretical concept of the distribution of the gross return
b(2) in the good and bad cases. Figures 3 and 4 are histograms of the gross return b(t)
denoted B1 in Mexico which defaulted/rescheduled and Tunisia which did not,
respectively. It is essential to study these histograms to estimate b(2) in the good and bad
cases.
In the Mexican case, the left tail of the gross return b(t) figure 3, reflects the debt
crises periods 1994-95, where the return fell drastically as a consequence of the crisis. We
minimize the weight of these outliers in the distribution of b (t) the gross return, by taking
as our measure of the expected return E[b(2)] = 0.15 in row 2 to be the median gross
return. We assume that b(1) was equal to the expected return The distribution of b(t) is
stationary/mean-reverting. The standard deviation of the gross return 0.16 is taken to be
an estimate of (a/2). Therefore the bad case b
-(2) =  .15 - .16 = -0.01, in row 3. The
investment ratio j(1) is the median investment/GDP ratio 0.22, in row 5; and the interest
rate r is taken as the median 0.08 in row 4.
The f-max for Mexico, based upon (10) is (10-MEX) equal to the maximal
debt/GDP that Mexico can have and yet repay if the bad event occurs. It is based upon the
histogram in figure 3 and data in table 1. Row 8, column 1 in table 1, states that f-max for
Mexico is 0.13. A similar calculation for Tunisia implies that f-max is 0.73: row 8,
column 2, in table 1 above.
f-max           = [(b
-(2)/b(1))   + (1 + b
-(2))j(1)] / (1 + r)   (10)
f-max = [(-0.12)/(.15) + (1 - .012)(.22)] / (1.08) = .13 (10-MEX)
It is not the debt ratio h(t) that is relevant for default (DEF), but the excess of the
actual debt over f-max. We calculate the difference (DEF) between the actual median
debt and f-max.  If DEF > 0, then the debt is “excessive” and the country is likely toStein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 18
default in the event that the bad case occurs. The resulting values of DEF = [actual
median debt/GDP - (f-max)] is in the row 9 of table 1. In Mexico, DEF = .45 - .13 = .32
and in Tunisia, DEF = -.116. Since the Mexican debt exceeded f-max, then default would
occur if the bad event arose.
Figure 5 is even more revealing. We plot the annual DEF(t) = h(t) - (f-max) =
actual debt/GDP in each year less the f-max (row 9 in table 1), for Mexico and Tunisia. In
Mexico, there was an excess debt DEF > 0 in every year 1978-99. In Tunisia, the excess
debt DEF < 0, except for a short period when it was slightly positive. The conclusions are
Mexico would default/reschedule, whereas Tunisia could repay the debt.
Figure 3. Mexico. Histogram of gross return b(t) = growth/investment ratio
Figure 4. Tunisia. Histogram of gross return b(t) =growth/investment ratio
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Excess debt/GDP, DEF(t) = (debt/GDP)(t) - (f-max),Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 22
 Table I
COMPARISON OF MEXICO AND TUNISIA
Variable: median, [range], (σ ) MEXICO ADF TUNISIA ADF
1.Debt/gdp = h(t) .45 [.81, .29](.14) -2.5 .61 [.74, .44](.09) -1.8
2.Gross return = b(t) .15 [.30, -.31](.16) -3.3* .167[.27,-.08] (.09) -3.5*
3. bad case b
-(2) (median b(2)- 1σ) =
-.012
(median b(2)-1σ)  =
.077
4.Interest rate= r(t) .08 [.15, .07] (.02) -1.89 .05[.06,.04] (.004) -3.67*
5.Investment/gdp = j(t) .22  (.02) -1.55 .28 (.04) -3.67*
6.Net return= x(t) .057[.17,- .39](.16) -2.1 .107 [.21,-.13](.09) -3.47*
7.Growth = g(t) .035[.08,-.06] (.036) -3.07* .049[.086, -.02] (.028) -3.5*
8.f-max .13 .73
9.DEF = h(t) - f-max .322 -.116
10.Cor(h,x) -.67 -.24
11.Cor(b,r) .02 -.11
Actual debt/GDP = h(t); maximal debt/GDP = f-max. We use median b(1), j(1), r(1) to eliminate the outlier
which may have been the consequence of the currency crisis. ADF is significant if there is an asterisk.
 f-max = [b
-(2)/b(1) + (1+b
-(2)) j(1)]/(1+r) is evaluated at the median investment ratio j(t). The net return is:
x(t) = b(t) - r(t).Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 23
3.2. Panel data analysis
The theory figure 2 describes the relation between f*(t) the constrained optimal
debt/GDP and the expected net return E[x(t)]. The net return x(t) = b(t) - r(t) = g(t)/j(t) -
r(t), where g(t) is the growth rate and j(t) is the investment ratio. As x(t) varies around a
stationary mean E[x(t)], the optimal f(t) should be constant. If one simply compared the
actual net return x(t) = g(t)/j(t) - r(t) with the actual debt/GDP , there is a negative bias.
When a crisis occurs, the growth rate g(t) declines and the actual GDP may fall. This
tends to raise h(t) = L(t)/Y(t) and lower the net return x(t). A noteworthy example is
Mexico (default), during the crisis 1980-82. The drastic decline in the return and the rise
in the debt/GDP may have been consequences of the crisis and reactions to it. An analysis
of panel data: country by sub-period may diminish the effect of the bias between
debt/GDP and net return.
Appendix tables A2 and A3 contain the panel data for the two sets of countries:
default/reschedule and a control group that did not default. The default countries are:
Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Egypt, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran,
Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa,
Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela. The control countries are: China, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Slovenia; India, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United
Arab Emirates, Zimbabwe. The growth and stability in the control set of countries are
tenuous, investment there is very risky, but they have not as yet defaulted.  Tables A2 and
A3 contain the values of debt/GDP = h(t), the return = b(t), the interest rate r(t), the net
return x(t) = b(t) - r(t), and the investment/GDP ratio = j(t), during four periods: 1980-84,
1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99. Table 2 summarizes the key relations that are pertinent to our
analysis.
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Scatter diagram figure 6 relates the h(t) = debt/GDP ratio to the x(t) = net return in a
panel of default/reschedule countries. Figure 7 does the same for the countries that did not
default/reschedule.
Figure 6. Scatter diagram, panel data Default countries: debt/GDP on net return












Figure 6. Default/reschedule countries
panel: 1980-84, 1985-89,1990-94,1995-99















Control group panel: 1980-84, 1985-89,1990-94,1995-99
h(t) = debt/GDP on x(t) = net returnStein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 27
Our conclusions are the following, based upon scatter diagrams figures 5,6,7 and
table 2. (A) In neither set of countries was the debt-net return relation even qualitatively
optimal. Both sets of countries are poor credit risks indeed. (A1) In neither set of
countries is the debt/GDP ratio positively and significantly correlated with the net return
(A2) Positive debt is associated with a zero net return, despite the great risk measured by
the standard deviation of the return. Compare figures 6-7 with the constrained optimal
case figure 2, where a positive debt is only optimal if the expected net return exceeds a
quantity d > 0, where d is positively related to the downside risk. (B) Both sets of
countries were similar except in one respect. Table 2 shows that: (B1) The median net
return x was higher, but not significantly so, in the control group. (B2) The investment
ratios j(t) were similar. (B3) The maximal debt/GDP was similar in the two groups. The
crucial difference was that: (C1) the actual debt/GDP was significantly higher in the
default group. (C2) Since the value of f-max was similar, the DEF = excess debt/GDP
was significantly positive 0.16 among the default countries, whereas DEF was not
significantly positive among the control countries.Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 28
      Table II
PANEL DATA: DEFAULT COUNTRIES VS CONTROL/NO DEFAULT COUNTRIES
periods: 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99
Variable: mean (σ ) Default Control *
Debt/gdp, h(t) .53 (.26) .37 (.18)
f-max .37 .34
DEF=debt/gdp - f-max .16 .03
Return b(t) .12 (.15) .14 (.13)
Net return x(t) .05 (.16) .07 (.14)
Investment/GDP j(t) .23 (.06) .26 (.06)
Correlation [h(t),x(t)]. 0 9 - 0 . 1 3
*exclude Kuwait, 1990-94Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 29
3.3 Early Warning Signals (EWS) of bubbles, vulnerability to shocks and default
We can derive early warning signals that an economy is vulnerable to shocks that
will lead to a default/rescheduling. Based upon the evidence in tables 1 and 2, the EWS of
the rescheduling should be a DEF(default) variable that is significantly positive and
persistent. To avoid false signals we require that, to be taken as an on-signal, DEF = [h(t)
- (f-max)] = [debt/GDP - (debt max /GDP)] be positive and either exceed one standard
deviation or that it has been rising. To examine the explanatory power of such a system
we construct a 2X2 contingency table 3. Each country in each sub-period is considered
one observation. The default (control) country data are in appendix table A2 (A3).
The rows of table 3 are the signal on/off. The first row refers to the on-signal. It is
conditioned on (a) the sign of DEF and whether either (b1) or (b2) below is satisfied. The
second row is the off- signal: the complement of the first row.
On-signal
 (a) DEF= [h(t) - (f-max)] > 0, and one of the following:
(b1) DEF > 1σ   or ( b2)  DEF rising.
The columns in table 3 refer to the occurrence/non-occurrence of rescheduling during the
subperiod.  Rescheduling is a legal act and comes after a period of difficulties. A caveat is
that political factors are operating so that there is often a political bailout. However, if the
country falls in row 1, this may be an EWS of a political bailout.
Table III, Contingency table by country
In 84% ( = 43/51) of the periods of rescheduling  the DEF variable has been
positive and was either greater than 1 standard deviation or rising.  In contingency table 3,
each country has been analysed by sub-period. The rows refer to the on/off signal. The
columns  refer to the occurrence/non-occurence of  rescheduling during the subperiod.
The χ
2 test concerns the independence of the rows and columns. Since the value of χ
2(1)Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 30
= 17.6 falls in the rejection region, we have to reject the null hypothesis of independence
of the two classification
12.
The conclusion is that: In the event of the bad case the countries in row 1, those
who have large and positive DEF, are expected to default, whereas those in row 2 where
DEF < 0 are not. Applying the Fleming/Stein mathematical analysis, we have provided
quantitative measures of whether economies are vulnerable to shocks that may lead to
default. These measures have been shown to have significant explanatory value.
                                                
12 To further investigate the explicative power of the DEF= [h(t) - (f-max)]  variable, we carried out a probit
analysis. The results are encouraging. The DEF is significant and positive, with a marginal effect of 11%.Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 31
Table III
CONTINGENCY TABLE BY COUNTRY
Number of observation in that category (expected cell frequency);
Total Number of obs. 127
Recheduling No Rescheduling Total
DEF>0; and
(i)DEF >1 σ









2 = 17.6 (1 d.f)**
51 76 127
Note: Each country has been analysed by sub-period, based upon appendixes 2 and 3.Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 32
 Appendix  1
List of Multilateral Relief Agreement with official and private creditors January
1980-December 1999
Country Official creditors Private Creditors
Algeria 1994; 1995 1992;1995
Argentina 1985;1987;1989;1991;1992 1983;1985;1987;1993
Bolivia 1986;1988; 1990;1992;1995:1998 1980;1981;1988;1992;1993
Brazil 1983;1987;1988;1992 1983;1984;1986;1988;1992;1994



















Source. World Bank , Global Development Finance 2000 Table A2.3 and Table A3.2Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 33
Appendix 2
Table A2
Summary Table Default Group
1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999
Country b(t) Rn(t) j(t) h(t) b(t) rn(t) j(t) h(t) b(t) rn(t) j(t) h(t) b(t) rn(t) j(t) h(t)
Algeria (ALG) 0.117 0.085 0.370 0.394 0.056 0.072 0.309 0.421 -0.012 0.070 0.278 0.611 0.148 0.065 0.241 0.722
Argentina (AR) 0.013 0.106 0.201 0.373 -0.073 0.082 0.125 0.640 0.333 0.064 0.176 0.369 0.117 0.069 0.188 0.446
Bolivia (BOL) -0.053 0.114 0.142 0.594 0.089 0.063 0.146 0.996 0.277 0.049 0.151 0.826 0.212 0.050 0.190 0.694
Brazil (BR) 0.683 0.122 0.169 0.369 0.225 0.087 0.223 0.396 0.079 0.058 0.215 0.348 0.098 0.062 0.217 0.317
Chile (CHL) 0.082 0.127 0.156 0.696 0.289 0.093 0.212 0.968 0.303 0.077 0.244 0.486 0.206 0.054 0.255 0.410
Ecuador (ECU) 0.097 0.110 0.218 0.508 0.125 0.085 0.207 0.917 0.178 0.056 0.201 1.015 -0.034 0.059 0.185 0.879
Egypt (EGY) 0.334 0.052 0.302 0.904 0.184 0.054 0.298 1.521 0.154 0.049 0.226 0.885 0.262 0.034 0.208 0.408
Indonesia (INDO) 0.249 0.084 0.258 0.200 0.160 0.066 0.325 0.599 0.229 0.056 0.335 0.601 -0.008 0.057 0.248 0.883
Iran (IR) 0.331 0.030 0.201 0.070 -0.097 0.013 0.145 0.022 0.354 0.008 0.199 0.207 0.093 0.052 0.229 0.195
Korea (KOR) 0.213 0.099 0.304 0.510 0.307 0.072 0.311 0.383 0.203 0.049 0.371 0.208 0.125 0.046 0.320 0.341
Mexico (MEX) 0.061 0.135 0.226 0.448 0.062 0.086 0.205 0.628 0.174 0.079 0.220 0.384 0.101 0.079 0.237 0.446
Morocco (MOR) 0.152 0.050 0.253 0.840 0.214 0.045 0.231 1.02 0.146 0.056 0.228 0.768 0.097 0.058 0.212 0.592
Peru (PER) 0.012 0.098 0.282 0.472 0.010 0.072 0.281 0.601 0.157 0.057 0.180 0.665 0.171 0.058 0.234 0.521
Philippines (PHIL) -0.018 0.074 0.268 0.656 0.176 0.063 0.170 0.839 0.077 0.056 0.286 0.606 0.161 0.047 0.220 0.671
Poland (POL) -0.112 0.117 0.247 0.383 0.105 0.086 0.314 0.514 -0.025 0.057 0.187 0.619 0.259 0.048 0.222 0.362
Romania (ROM) 0.111 0.095 0.356 0.228 -0.023 0.078 0.308 0.093 -0.143 0.039 0.286 0.127 -0.061 0.051 0.219 0.240
Russian Fed (RUS) na na na na na na na na -0.390 0.065 0.236 0.401 -0.104 0.072 0.189 0.515
South Africa (SAF) 0.100 0.105 0.267 0.266 0.077 0.087 0.191 0.325 0.012 0.077 0.153 0.213 0.141 0.075 0.161 0.267
Turkey (TUR) 0.207 0.085 0.264 0.331 0.257 0.070 0.231 0.482 0.140 0.063 0.241 0.376 0.164 0.056 0.239 0.494
Uruguay (URU) -0.141 0.081 0.146 0.562 0.317 0.075 0.122 0.889 0.299 0.062 0.137 0.672 0.134 0.058 0.155 0.637
Venezuela (VEN) -0.124 0.133 0.206 0.586 0.020 0.100 0.211 0.651 0.249 0.081 0.169 0.661 0.132 0.075 0.184 0.431Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 34
Table A3
Summary Table Control Group
1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99
Country + x(t) rn(t) j(t) h(t) x(t) rn(t) j(t) h(t) x(t) rn(t) j(t) h(t) x(t) rn(t) j(t) h(t)
China (CI) na 0.11 na 0.03 0.21 0.03 0.36 0.12 0.22 0.05 0.38 0.18 0.17 0.04 0.39 0.18
Cezch Republic (CK) na na na na 0.04 0.10 0.27 0.14 -0.16 0.08 0.25 0.24 -0.03 0.08 0.32 0.39
Estonia (ESTO) na na na na na na na na -0.12 0.03 0.26 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.27 0.45
Hunghary (HUNG) -0.03 0.10 0.28 0.49 -0.03 0.08 0.27 0.70 -0.23 0.07 0.21 0.64 0.03 0.08 0.28 0.58
India (IN) 0.21 0.02 0.24 0.15 0.20 0.03 0.25 0.24 0.14 0.05 0.24 0.32 0.20 0.06 0.25 0.26
Kuwait (KW) -0.10 0.10 0.16 0.47 0.47 0.07 0.13 0.43 1.28 0.06 0.17 0.87 -0.08 0.08 0.12 0.58
Lebanon (LB) na na na na na na na na 0.25 0.06 0.27 0.34 0.01 0.10 0.36 0.37
Malaysia (MAL) 0.11 0.07 0.36 0.46 0.10 0.07 0.28 0.71 0.37 0.06 0.38 0.50 0.05 0.06 0.37 0.45
Saudi Arabia (SARA) -0.12 0.12 0.25 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.19 0.20 0.13 0.07 0.21 0.16 -0.01 0.08 0.19 0.20
Slovenia (SLO) na na na na na na na na -0.21 0.09 0.18 0.32 0.11 0.05 0.24 0.36
Tunisia (TU) 0.10 0.06 0.33 0.48 0.04 0.05 0.24 0.48 0.11 0.05 0.28 0.60 0.13 0.05 0.27 0.63
United Arab
Emirates
(UAE) -0.09 0.14 0.28 0.22 0.02 0.08 0.24 0.36 0.15 0.06 0.25 0.45 0.08 0.05 0.27 0.46
Zimbawe (ZW) 0.16 0.08 0.2 0.27 0.18 0.07 0.17 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.21 0.53 0.08 0.04 0.22 0.69Stein - Paladino,  Country Default Risk 35
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